

GOOP Group of Oil Producers

Access files at
davidbarrus.com and
then click on “GOOP
Economic Experiment
2023” link.



Outcomes of the Game


- A game theory experience for students
- Experience how interdependence impacts decision making
- Predict monopoly, Cournot, and competitive outcomes before the game mathematically (upper-division courses).
- Compare theory to classroom results

Basics of the Game

- Divide students into 10 groups (can be less)
- Create country name.
- Play 5 rounds – chance will determine if an additional 3 rounds are played
- Joint profit max – each country produces 4.5 million barrels per round
- Each country can produce 0 – 36.1 million barrels per round. (quantity choice)
- War / Limited Action

Demand & Costs (in millions)

- $Q_{\text{Demanded}} = 100 - \text{Price}_{\text{oil}}$ or $\text{Price}_{\text{oil}} = 100 - Q$.
- Each barrel cost \$10
- Collectively:
 - Total Revenue = $Q(100-Q)$
 - Total Cost = $10Q$
 - So $MR = 100 - 2Q$ and $MC = 10$
- Setting $MR = MC$ we find the optimal $Q = 45$ or 4.5 for each country per round (with 10 countries).



Running the Game

- Handouts
- Spreadsheet
- All handouts and spreadsheets can be found at davidbarrus.com. Click on “Goop Game Files” and then click the link “Goop Economic Experiment 2023” to access the files.

Predicted Results

- 10 firms
- Game: Simultaneous repeated game
- Monopoly outcome – Profit Max
 - Individual Quantity: 4.5 million barrels
 - Market Quantity: 45 million barrels
 - Market Price: \$55
 - Extra Credit: 5 points on final exam

Predicted Results

- 10 firms
- Cournot outcome
 - Individual Quantity: 8.2 million barrels
 - Market Quantity: 82 million barrels
 - Market Price: \$18
- Competitive outcome
 - Individual Quantity: 9.0 million barrels
 - Market Quantity: 90 million barrels
 - Market Price: \$10

If all others produce 4.5

$$\text{Profit } (\pi) = (100 - Q_T)Q_i - 10Q_i$$

$$\pi = (100 - 40.5 - Q_i)Q_i - 10Q_i$$

$$\pi = 100Q_i - 40.5Q_i - Q_i^2 - 10Q_i$$


$$\pi = 49.5Q_i - Q_i^2$$

- First derivative: $49.5 - Q_i = 0$
 - So your optimal $Q_i = 24.75$
 - Your extra credit is 15.13
- Everyone else gets 2.75


Results

- Games played 2014-2023
- 43 games played in lower division courses
- 19 games played in upper division courses

Market Quantity by Round and Course



Market Quantity - Distribution



Enforcement

- War (MC+\$35) and Limited Action (MC+\$15)
- 70% votes to pass

Rounds	Number of Rounds (Total)	War (%)	Limited Action (%)	Resolution Passes (%)
1	62	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
2	62	40.2%	4.3%	17.9%
3	62	16.9%	7.9%	2.6%
4	62	11.6%	16.9%	3.1%
5	62	9.7%	22.6%	5.6%
6	32	22.6%	13.2%	12.2%
7	31	3.4%	15.8%	3.1%
8	31	0.0%	13.1%	2.7%
Grand Total	404	14.0%	11.1%	5.9%

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5	62	9.7%	22.6%	5.6%
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Success of Enforcement

- War (MC+\$35) and Limited Action (MC+\$15)
- 70% votes to pass

IF WAR WAS DECLARED...			IF LIMITED ACTION WAS DECLARED...		
Rounds	Number of Rounds (Total)	Resolution Passes (%)	Rounds	Number of Rounds (Total)	Resolution Passes (%)
2	25	44%	2	3	0.0%
3	10	8%	3	5	15.2%
4	7	27%	4	10	0.0%
5	6	29%	5	14	12.3%
6	8	40%	6	4	23.1%
7	1	0%	7	5	19.6%
8	0	0%	8	4	21.1%
Grand Total	57	33%	Grand Total	45	11.6%

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5	6	29%	5	14	12.3%
6	8	40%	6	4	23.1%
7	1	0%	7	5	19.6%
8	0	0%	8	4	21.1%
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Aftermath of War and LA

- War declared the most often in Round 2
- Limited action declared the most in Round 5

After War & LA	Number of Games	Number of Rounds (Total)	Market Q (Avg)	Market Q (SD)
Round of or Before LA/W	48.8	316	62.4	25.1
Round After LA Did Not Pass	4.6	31	90.7	43.9
Round After War Did Not Pass	4.9	34	86.1	30.6
Round After LA Passed	0.5	4	47.0	6.8
Round After War Passed	3.2	19	57.6	20.8
Grand Total	62	404	66.4	29.1

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Extra Credit

- Students (on average) would do better if they colluded
- A few groups get more than 5 points

Course	Total Games Played	Number of Rounds (Total)	Avg. Extra Credit	SD. Extra Credit	Max EC	Min EC
Lower Division (100-level)	43	267	3.17	1.59	6.99	-2.50
Upper Division (300/400-level)	19	137	1.49	1.84	8.10	-3.72
Grand Total	62	404	2.59	1.86	8.10	-3.72

Voting on War and LA – Extra Credit

- ALWAYS better to vote NO
 - Whether or not it passes
 - In terms of extra credit

Motion on War/Limited Action Course/Votes on Motion	Number of Rounds (Total)		Avg. Extra Credit		SD. Extra Credit	
	Motion- Failed	Motion- Passed	Motion- Failed	Motion- Passed	Motion- Failed	Motion- Passed
Voted NO on Motion	351	4	2.66*	3.28	1.87	1.37
Voted YES on Motion	26	23	1.44*	2.70	1.59	1.56
Grand Total	377	27	2.58	2.79	1.88	1.54

*Significantly different than motion-passed and significantly different between voted "no" and voted "yes" at 95% level.

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Files” or scan QR
code.



Thank you!

Mindi Anderson


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Per-Group Output (MC=10) by number of groups



	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Monopoly q (\$10)	22.5	15.0	11.3	9.0	7.5	6.4	5.6	5.0	4.5
Cournot q (\$10)	30.0	22.5	18.0	15.0	12.9	11.3	10.0	9.0	8.2
Competitive q (\$10)	45.0	30.0	22.5	18.0	15.0	12.9	11.3	10.0	9.0

Summary Statistics

- 2014-2023
- 4 instructors
- Lower vs. Upper Division

Course	Number of Games	Number of Rounds (Avg)	Number of Rounds (Total)	Market Q (Avg)	Market Q (SD)	Market Q (Max)	Market Q (Min)
Lower Division (100-level)	43	6.6	267	60.2	27.4	218.5	14.0
Upper Division (300/400-level)	19	7.4	137	77.9	28.6	218.0	19.0
Grand Total	62	6.9	404	66.4	29.1	218.5	14

Summary Statistics

By Course and Instructor

Course/ Instructor	Number of Games	Number of Rounds (Avg)	Number of Rounds (Total)	Market Q (Avg)	Market Q (SD)	Market Q (Max)	Market Q (Min)
ECON 150	35	6.7	221	59.5	26.9	218.5	14.0
Anderson	19	6.1	111	56.2	24.3	188.8	27.5
Barrus	10	7.6	74	68.3	31.1	218.5	19.3
Ma	6	6.4	36	50.3	17.6	112.0	14.0
ECON 300/476	19	7.4	137	77.9	28.6	218.0	19.0
Barrus	7	7.7	53	65.3	25.8	152.7	19.0
Hirschi	12	7.3	84	85.1	27.6	218.0	45.8
FDAMF 101	8	6.1	46	63.5	29.2	181.9	39.6
Anderson	5	5.9	28	56.4	17.8	116.0	39.6
Barrus	3	6.3	18	74.0	38.3	181.9	42.0
Grand Total	62	6.9	404	66.4	29.1	218.5	14.0

Points	Total Profit	% of Ideal	Q1	Profit	Q2	Profit	Q3	Profit	Q4	Profit	Q5	Profit
15.13	\$3,062.81	30%	24.75	612.56	24.75	612.56	24.75	612.6	24.75	612.6	24.75	612.5625
2.75	\$ 556.88	6%	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.375
2.75	\$ 556.88	6%	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.375
2.75	\$ 556.88	6%	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.375
2.75	\$ 556.88	6%	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.375
2.75	\$ 556.88	6%	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.375
2.75	\$ 556.88	6%	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.375
2.75	\$ 556.88	6%	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.375
2.75	\$ 556.88	6%	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.375
2.75	\$ 556.88	6%	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.38	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.4	4.5	111.375
		Market Q	65.25		65.25		65.25		65.25		65.25	
		Market P	34.75		34.75		34.75		34.75		34.75	

Everyone goes 24.75

Points	Total Profit	% of Ideal	Q1	Profit	Q2	Profit	Q3	Profit	Q4	Profit	Q5	Profit
-6.11	\$ (1,237.50)	-12%	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-248	24.75	-248	24.75	-247.5
-6.11	\$ (1,237.50)	-12%	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-248	24.75	-248	24.75	-247.5
-6.11	\$ (1,237.50)	-12%	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-248	24.75	-248	24.75	-247.5
-6.11	\$ (1,237.50)	-12%	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-248	24.75	-248	24.75	-247.5
-6.11	\$ (1,237.50)	-12%	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-248	24.75	-248	24.75	-247.5
-6.11	\$ (1,237.50)	-12%	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-248	24.75	-248	24.75	-247.5
-6.11	\$ (1,237.50)	-12%	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-248	24.75	-248	24.75	-247.5
-6.11	\$ (1,237.50)	-12%	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-248	24.75	-248	24.75	-247.5
-6.11	\$ (1,237.50)	-12%	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-248	24.75	-248	24.75	-247.5
-6.11	\$ (1,237.50)	-12%	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-248	24.75	-248	24.75	-247.5
-6.11	\$ (1,237.50)	-12%	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-247.5	24.75	-248	24.75	-248	24.75	-247.5
		Market Q	247.5		247.5		247.5		247.5		247.5	
		Market P	0		0		0		0		0	

Cournot

- $P = 100 - Q$ and $MC = \$10$
- With 10 producers: Equilibrium = $90/11 = 8.1818$

Points	Total Profit	% of Ideal	Q1	Profit	Q2	Profit	Q3	Profit	Q4	Profit	Q5	Profit
1.65	\$ 334.71	3%	8.182	66.942	8.1818	66.942	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94215
1.65	\$ 334.71	3%	8.182	66.942	8.1818	66.942	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94215
1.65	\$ 334.71	3%	8.182	66.942	8.1818	66.942	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94215
1.65	\$ 334.71	3%	8.182	66.942	8.1818	66.942	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94215
1.65	\$ 334.71	3%	8.182	66.942	8.1818	66.942	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94215
1.65	\$ 334.71	3%	8.182	66.942	8.1818	66.942	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94215
1.65	\$ 334.71	3%	8.182	66.942	8.1818	66.942	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94215
1.65	\$ 334.71	3%	8.182	66.942	8.1818	66.942	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94215
1.65	\$ 334.71	3%	8.182	66.942	8.1818	66.942	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94215
1.65	\$ 334.71	3%	8.182	66.942	8.1818	66.942	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94	8.182	66.94215
		Market Q	81.82		81.818		81.82		81.82		81.82	
		Market P	18.18		18.182		18.18		18.18		18.18	

No incentive to change production

- $P = 100 - Q$ and $MC = \$10$
- With 10 producers: Equilibrium = $90/11 = 8.1818$

	Cournot									
	Q1	Profit	Q2	Profit	Q3	Profit	Q4	Profit	Q5	Profit
	4.5	202.5	24.75	612.56	8.182	66.94	8.3	66.93	8	66.91
	4.5	202.5	4.5	111.38	8.182	66.94	8.182	65.98	8.182	68.43
	4.5	202.5	4.5	111.38	8.182	66.94	8.182	65.98	8.182	68.43
	4.5	202.5	4.5	111.38	8.182	66.94	8.182	65.98	8.182	68.43
	4.5	202.5	4.5	111.38	8.182	66.94	8.182	65.98	8.182	68.43
	4.5	202.5	4.5	111.38	8.182	66.94	8.182	65.98	8.182	68.43
	4.5	202.5	4.5	111.38	8.182	66.94	8.182	65.98	8.182	68.43
	4.5	202.5	4.5	111.38	8.182	66.94	8.182	65.98	8.182	68.43
	4.5	202.5	4.5	111.38	8.182	66.94	8.182	65.98	8.182	68.43
	4.5	202.5	4.5	111.38	8.182	66.94	8.182	65.98	8.182	68.43
Market Q	45		65.25		81.82		81.94		81.64	
Market P	55		34.75		18.18		18.06		18.36	